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Dual Nationality in France and the United
States
By SIMONE TAN*
Member of the Class of 1992
I. INTRODUCTION
In a time of burgeoning international interaction, an increasing
number of Americans find themselves transferred abroad to work for
U.S. companies or decide to find new opportunities and experiences else-
where. Thus, the United States has changed its status from a pure immi-
grant nation to a country which can claim approximately three million
citizens who are presently living abroad.' As a result, incidences of dual
nationality are becoming less of an anomaly.
This Note argues that the United States should adopt a measure that
will facilitate the manner in which its citizens may pass on citizenship to
their children born abroad. To this end, France's experience with its
dual nationals could serve as an example. The Note examines the legal
situation of U.S. citizens who acquire dual nationality at birth and com-
pares it to the way France deals with its dual nationals. It analyzes the
historical development of both systems and the differences between citi-
zenship acquired by birth in the country (fus sol) and citizenship re-
ceived at birth through a parent (jus sanguinis). Specifically, it will focus
on how citizenship is passed on to the next generation, and the unex-
pected consequences American parents may face in discovering that their
child carries a different passport.
Finally, the Note will show that dual nationality does not necessar-
ily result in embarrassment as some authors have stated,' but can be of
value to the interests of the United States. By removing the impediments
to transmitting U.S. citizenship the United States would alleviate a ma-
jor concern of its 'ambassadors' overseas, and gain the valuable experi-
* B.A., Oberlin College, 1987.
1. Barry James, For U.& Expatriates, Sympathy but No Promises, INT'L HERALD TRiw.
July 6, 1990.
2. See Solicitor General in Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1963): "[O]ther coun-
tries, it is said, frequently attempt to treat such persons as their own citizens, thus embroiling
the United States in conflicts when it attempts to afford them protection."
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ence and tax dollars of those citizens. France's Code de la Nationalitd
Frangaise is an example of how a nation can effectively handle situations
in which multi-nationality arises without penalizing citizens who reside
abroad. The United States could draw on the principles of France's solu-
tion to strengthen its ties with its citizens residing abroad and to profit
from their experiences.
II. THE NATURE OF CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship has been defined as membership in a political society.
This membership confers a duty of allegiance on the member and a duty
of protection on society.3 Within the realm of international law, a state's
duty consists of protecting its citizens against another state as well as
receiving them into its territory should they be expelled by another
country.4
There is no unified rule of international law regulating to whom citi-
zenship will be extended. Each nation determines under its national
laws who is or is not a subject.' This can result in complications. For
instance, two nations may both claim an individual as their citizen,
thereby creating a dual national. Alternatively, no state may confer citi-
zenship on this person, with the result of statelessness.
Statelessness is considered a greater evil than dual nationality. In
terms of international law a stateless person can look to no country for
protection, nor claim rights granted to an ordinary citizen. As part of an
international initiative to eliminate the incidences of statelessness, article
15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "1) Every-
one has the right to a nationality. 2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality."'6
Dual nationality is not as devastating to the individual as stateless-
ness, since such a person can look to two countries for protection. How-
ever, it has been considered an undesirable state of affairs7 which nations
3. PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (1956)
(citing Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913)).
4. L. LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE 645-46 (Hersh Lauter-
pacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
5. Id. at 643.
6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (I1), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 74
(1948).
7. At times dual nationality can lead to conflicting claims from both nations regarding
taxation, military service, or the state's assertion of its right to protect its citizens abroad.




have attempted to eradicate through a number of measures."
I. ACQUIRING CITIZENSHIP AT BIRTH IN THE U.S
A. Jus Sanguinis-Jus Soli
In most cases, citizenship is acquired at birth (original nationality).9
There are two different modes of acquiring original nationality."0 One is
by birth within the territory (us solO, the other through descent Fus
sanguinis). Within common law countries the Anglo-Saxon concept of
jus soli is more prevalent.11 It is based on the principle of allegiance be-
tween a state and its citizen. On the other hand, countries following ro-
man law prefer the idea ofjus sanguinis, where nationality is regarded as
a status that confers rights and obligations on a citizen.'
2
Dual nationality is acquired when the principles ofjus sanguinis and
jus soli of two or more countries apply at the same time to the same
person. 3 As a result, an individual can hold American citizenship due to
birth in the United States and also be a French national by birth to a
French parent. Further methods of acquiring dual nationality 4 are: 1)
birth of an illegitimate child in one country who is subsequently legiti-
mized by a foreign-born father; 2) naturalization in one country without
loss of prior citizenship; 3) return to the country of origin of a natural-
ized citizen of another country and reacquisition of the former national-
ity; 4) derivative acquisition of citizenship by a child through the
8. The Nationality Act of 1907 listed three acts which result in loss of U.S. citizenship:
1) naturalization in a foreign state; 2) oath of allegiance to a foreign state; and 3) marriage of
an American woman to a foreigner. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-193, §§ 2, 3,34 Stat.
1228. In 1922 the Cable Act of Sept. 22 allowed marriage of an American woman to an alien
without loss of nationality. Act Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of Married
Women, ch. 411, 42 Stat. 1021 (1922). The 1940 Act added seven more grounds of expatria-
tion including service in the armed force of a foreign state by a national of that state and voting
in a political election of a foreign state. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 401-10, 54 Stat.
1168.
9. OPPENHEim, supra note 4, at 651.
10. Weis differentiates between original acquisition, at birth and derivative acquisition
through naturalization. This note will focus primarily on original acquisition. WEIS, supra
note 3, at 97-99.
11. Id. at4.
12. Id. at 32.
13. Comment, supra note 7, at 294.
14. One has to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary acquisition of another na-
tionality. In the U.S. voluntary dual-nationality, i.e., naturalization in a foreign state, may
result in expatriation, while in the case of 'involuntary' dual-nationality where foreign citizen-
ship is acquired without applying for naturalization or swearing an oath of allegiance, the
government ignores the existence of the second nationality. See infra note 83.
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naturalization of its parents; or 5) acquisition through marriage.1 5
B. Historical Development of the Law
Citizenship in the United States primarily has been based on a sys-
tem of allegiance. Prior to the Civil War, and until the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the United States adhered to the doctrine of
indelible allegiance. According to this doctrine, birth within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States created citizenship an allegiance to the nation
which the citizen had no right to terminate without the government's
consent. 6 The original Constitution itself did not address the issue of
citizenship 7 besides granting Congress the power to establish a uniform
rule of naturalization. 8
In addition to citizenship based on birth within the United States,
Congress enacted legislation during the First Congress providing that the
foreign-born children of American citizens "shall be considered as natu-
ral-born citizens ... [p]rovided, that the right of citizenship shall not
descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United
States."1 9
The Fourteenth Amendment finally created a constitutional stan-
dard of citizenship: "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States."'2 The main impetus for adding this clause to the Fourteenth
Amendment was to secure and protect the nationality of black citizens
by making it impossible for subsequent Congresses to take away this
civil right.2" However, this clause created problems of its own since it
did not make clear whether a foreign-born citizen who had received citi-
15. Comment, supra note 7, at 295.
16. David F. Schwartz, American Citizenship after Afroyim and Belle: Continuing Contro.
versy, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1003, 1004 (1975).
17. The Constitution as originally adopted contained no definition of United States citi-
zenship, nor did it address the issue of expatriation. The former is probably due to the desire
to avoid entanglement in the then existing controversy between concepts of state and national
citizenship and the difficult question of the status of African-American slaves. Rogers v. Bel-
lei, 401 U.S. 815, 828-29 (1970). The question of expatriation on the other hand, was never
relevant because the concept of indelible allegiance did not allow for such an action by the
citizen.
See also Elwin Griffith, Expatriation and the American Citizen, 31 How. L.J. 453, 455 (1988).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
19. Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 104 (1790),
quoted in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 672-73 (1897).
20. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1967).
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zenship derivatively came within the ambit of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark" held that the Four-
teenth Amendment contemplated only two sources of citizenship: citi-
zenship by birth and by naturalization.' "Citizenship by naturalization
can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the
form of law. But citizenship by birth is established by the mere fact of
birth under the circumstances defined in the Constitution. 24 According
to the opinion, foreign-born children of American parents were not citi-
zens by birth since the U.S. did not recognize the concept ofjus sanguinis
by which citizenship is passed on derivatively.' However, such a person
born outside of the jurisdiction of the United States had become a natu-
ralized citizen when Congress exercised its authority and declared for-
eign-born children of Americans to be United States citizens.26
Congress, empowered by the Constitution to establish a uniform
rule of naturalization, exercised this power for the first time with the Act
of 1790 entitled "An act to establish an uniform rule of naturaliza-
tion."'27 It thereby extended citizenship to "[tjhe children of citizens of
the United States that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the
United States."' 28
The court addressed the problems inherent in such a grant of citi-
zenship. Thus, by being considered natural-born citizens, a foreign-born
person may be subjected to conflicting demands by its country of birth
and the United States. This would be the case, fof example, if a citizen
were drafted into the military of two countries. The court, citing an ad-
visory opinion by Attorney General Hoar, cautioned that while children
who received derivative citizenship were entitled to all the privileges of
citizenship within the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the United States,
22. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1897) (case involved the issue whether
a person born of Chinese parents within the jurisdiction of the United States was a citizen
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
23. Id, at 702.
24. Id,
25. See id. at 666-67.
26. Id at 702-03. Specifically the court stated that:
A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen
by being naturalized... by authority of Congress, exercised either by declaring cer-
tain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon
foreign-born children of citizens, or by enabling foreigners individually to become
citizens by proceedings in the judicial tribunals.
Id (emphasis added).
27. Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, 1 Stat. 103 (1790).
28. I d; Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 672.
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such legislation could not go as far as to "interfere with the just rights of
[the nation of birth] to the government and control of its own subjects." '29
It appears that this conflict could be resolved if the United States were to
extend its protection only in those cases where the individual is either
within its jurisdiction or not subject to the jurisdiction of his or her coun-
try of birth.30
In spite of these problematic issues the Court in Wong Kim Ark held
that the Fourteenth Amendment extended citizenship to those born or
naturalized in the United States and that foreign-born citizens who had
received citizenship through an act of Congress were to be considered
naturalized.31 The Court further declared that Congress' power of natu-
ralization was only a power to confer citizenship, not to take it away. "A
naturalized citizen becomes a member of the society, possessing all the
rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the Constitution,
on the footing of a native.",32 Since Wong Kim Ark the status of foreign-
born, dual nationals has been subject to much debate and conflicting
opinions.
C. Immigration and Nationality Act of 19523
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 continued to express
the difference between citizens who receive their citizenship at birth by
birth on U.S. soil and foreign-born citizens who received their nationality
at birth derivatively from their U.S. citizen parent. 34 According to the
Act, foreign-born citizens who had received their citizenship at birth
from their citizen parents, had to comply with a residence requirement of
five years which had to begin before attaining the age of twenty-three in
order to keep their citizenship.35 This requirement imposed an irrational
burden on the individual. Foreign-born citizens who did not have the
means to relocate to the United States before turning twenty-three years
old would be denied citizenship. On the other hand, a child born in the
United States to alien parents whose parents decided to relocate the fam-
29. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 689.
30. For an explanation of this concept of effective nationality see supra notes 171-80 and
accompanying text.
31. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 702-03.
32. Id. at 703 (citing Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824)).
33. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-144, 66 Stat. 163 (current
version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1988 & Supp. 1 1990)) [hereinafter Act of '52].
34. Act of '52, § 301(a)(1), (a)(7).
35. Act of '52, § 301(b).
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ily to their home country would never have to face this burden.36 This
child received constitutionally granted citizenship which the United
States could only extinguish if the individual committed an expatriating
act. The foreign-born child however, was a statutorily created citizen
with no constitutional right to its nationality. Thus Congress could con-
dition this right just as it could grant it.
The Act provided for only one exception to the five-year require-
ment. In section 301(a)(7) it specified that the residence requirement
could be satisfied during time spent abroad as the dependent of a citizen
parent serving with the Armed Forces or employed with an international
organization (as defined by the International Organizations Immunities
Act).3 7 This exception does not apply to the dependent of a parent who
was working for an American corporation abroad, although such a par-
ent would be serving the interest of the nation by promoting American
business. Nor would the section apply to a citizen born abroad and now
working abroad, using his or her cultural skills to promote American
interests. Thus, with its insensitive treatment of foreign-born citizens the
Act perpetuated the discrimination of foreign-born citizens.
D. Dual Nationality in the Courts
Two landmark cases appeared to turn the tide for dual nationals.
Schneider v. Rusk involved a native-born German who came to the
United States with her parents."8 There she derivatively received United
States citizenship when her parents were naturalized. 39 Upon graduat-
ing from college she returned to Europe, married a German citizen and
continued to reside in Germany.' Under section 352(a)(1) of the Immi-
gration Act of 1952, which provided that a naturalized citizen should
lose her nationality by residing for three continuous years in her country
of origin, Schneider was denied a U.S. passport.4" She sued for declara-
36. In Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1938), the Court admits to this distinction between
foreign-born and native-born citizens who grew up abroad. The Court unconvincingly states
that although there is no statutory provision that would require residency from native-born
minor citizens who left the country, a person who has long manifested no intention to return to
the United States should not receive protection unless expressly approved by the department.
Id at 346.
This policy would not alleviate the greater burden faced by foreign-born citizens; it leaves it
completely to the discretion of the department to ascertain whether one manifests an intention
to return or not.
37. Act of '52, § 301(a)(7).
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tory judgment, urging that she was still a citizen.42 The Court ruled that
the provision in section 352(a)(1) was an unjustifiable form of discrimina-
tion since a native-born could reside abroad for as long as he or she
wanted to while a naturalized citizen, although constitutionally possess-
ing all the rights of a native citizen, could not.43 The Court especially
criticized the State Department for making the "impermissible assump-
tion that naturalized citizens as a class are less reliable and bear less alle-
giance to this country than do the native born.""1 It continued by
expressly stating that "[iving abroad, whether the citizen be naturalized
or native born, is no badge of lack of allegiance and in no way evidences a
voluntary renunciation of nationality and allegiance. It may indeed be
compelled by family, business, or other legitimate reasons." 45 With this
decision the Court actually went as far as questioning the validity of the
assumption that Congress through its power over foreign relations, has
the power to deprive citizens who hold two passports of their United
States citizenship.
Afroyim v. Rusk," also involved a naturalized citizen and the issue
of denationalization.47 This case firmly established that Fourteenth
Amendment citizenship belonged to the individual until he or she volun-
tarily relinquished it.48 The Court stated that the framers of the Amend-
ment "wanted to put citizenship beyond the power of any governmental
unit to destroy." '49 In its holding the Court forcefully explained that citi-
zenship was "no light trifle to be jeopardized any moment Congress
decid[ed] to do so under the name of one of its general or implied grants
of power."5 The loss of citizenship could result in a person being left
without the protection of "any country in this world."51 Further, the
Court pointed out that since citizenship was part of a "cooperative af-
fair" between the citizenry and the country, "[t]he very nature of our free
government ma[de] it completely incongruous to have a rule of law
under which a group of citizens temporarily in office (could deprive] an-
other group of citizens of their citizenship." 2 Thus a citizen had "a con-
42. Id
43. Id. at 168-69.
44. Id. at 168.
45. Id. at 169.
46. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
47. Afroyim had been denied a passport on the grounds that he had lost his citizenship by
voting in a foreign election, one of the grounds for expatriation. See Act of '52, § 346(a)(5).
48. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 262.
49. Id at 263.





stitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily
relinquishe[d] that citizenship."
5 3
Although aimed at the naturalized citizen, the decisions could ar-
guably apply to the foreign-born as well. In United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, the Court had already included foreign-born citizens in the group of
naturalized citizens by characterizing Congress's power to extend citizen-
ship to foreign-born children of Americans as an act of naturalization.-
Thus, a foreign-born child by virtue of congressional legislation would
have become a naturalized American at birth. It follows that such a per-
son would be included in the holding in Afroyim. In addition, Afroyim
states general principles of citizenship which ought to apply to all Ameri-
cans. Citizenship is too precious a right to be altered upon a whim of
Congress. Once "[the naturalized citizen] becomes a member of the soci-
ety, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view
of the constitution, ... [ t]he constitution does not authorize Congress to
enlarge or abridge those rights.""5 It follows that Congress, a group of
citizens, should not be able to deprive foreign-born Americans, another
group of citizens, of their citizenship. "The simple power of the national
Legislature, is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exer-
cise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual."56 Thus,
citizenship once conferred should be virtually indestructible unless the
citizen voluntarily chooses expatriation. Afroyim also made clear that
the government's interest in conducting foreign affairs without the inter-
ference of private citizens was not a sufficiently compelling reason to de-
nationalize those who acted in a way that might result in such
interference.5 7 However, the apparent certainty of Afroyim was soon
shaken with the decision in Rogers v. Bellei5
Bellei involved a foreign-born dual national who questioned the va-
lidity of the residence requirement for Americans born abroad. Bellei
was born in Italy to an American mother.5 9 He had visited the United
States on several occasions, had registered with the selective service, but
had failed to comply with the five-year residence requirement of the 1952
Immigration and Naturalization Act.' As a result he lost his citizen-
53. I,
54. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1897).
55. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 261 (1967) (citing Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v.
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824)).
56. Id
57. Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1020.
58. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1970).
59. Id at 817.
60. Id at 818-20.
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ship.6 A three judge district court held the resident requirement uncon-
stitutional, basing its decision on Afroyim. 62
The Supreme Court reversed this decision. It distinguished this case
from Afroyim because Bellei was not born in the United States, and thus
was not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. :His citizenship was
merely statutory, created by Congress. In contrast, Afroyim's and
Schneider's citizenships were based on naturalization. According to the
Bellei decision constitutional citizenship consisted of three factors: 1)
birth in the U.S.; 2) naturalization in the U.S.; and 3) subjection to U.S.
jurisdiction.63 This definition of citizenship clearly excluded a foreign-
born citizen. As Bellei was not protected by the Court's definition of
Fourteenth Amendment citizenship, Congress had the power to dena-
tionalize him if he did not fulfill certain conditions subsequent." Thus
the Court ruled that the five-year residency requirement was
constitutional.
Surprisingly, the court also resurrected the State Department's justi-
fication that the government's interest in conducting foreign affairs was
sufficient reason to denationalize "certain" individuals.65 This is in direct
contrast to the decision in Afroyim. Apparently, the Bellei court, under
Chief Justice Burger, did not consider citizenship as important a right as
did the Supreme Court under Justice Warren.
The dissent by Justices Black, Douglas, and Marshall strongly dis-
agreed with this view, pointing out that the "precious Fourteenth
Amendment American citizenship should not be blown around by every
passing political wind that changes the composition of th[e] court."
'66
The dissent rejected the argument that Bellei was not a Fourteenth
Amendment citizen. Relying on United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the dis-
senters embraced a comprehensive definition of naturalization that "in-
clud[es] ... all modes of acquiring... citizenship other than birth in this
country" including citizenship acquired by the foreign-born through a
61. Id. at 820.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 830.
64. Id. at 835.
65. Three reasons were given for this:
One who has a dual nationality will be subject to claims from bvth nations, claims
which at times may be competing or conflicting... that one with dual nationality
cannot turn that status into a fair-weather citizenship, and that circumstances may
compel one who has a dual nationality to do acts which otherwise would not be
compatible with the oligations of American citizenship.
Id. at 832 (citing Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 723-36 (1952)).
66. Id. at 837.
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parent.6 7 It logically followed that Bellei was protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment as a naturalized citizen.
This interpretation of the dictum in Wong Kim Ark has been criti-
cized. Those who disagree with the dissent argue that Congress was
completely aware of the issue of foreign-bornjus sanguinis citizens at the
time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.6" Had Congress in-
tended to include foreign-born citizens, it would have used different lan-
guage to accomplish this.69 Therefore, the phrasing "naturalized in the
United States" 70 as opposed to "into" the United States was consciously
selected to exclude foreign-born citizens from the rights guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
71
Through the Bellei decision, the court began to remove citizenship
from the "preferred status to which Afroyim had elevated it"' Follow-
ing the decision, only those born in the United States could be assured of
retaining their citizenship.73
E. Expatriation74
The decision in Vance v. Terrazas75 opened the door to another
threat to the dual national's citizenship: Expatriation. Terrazas, a dual
national with Mexican and American citizenship had applied for a certif-
icate of Mexican nationality to satisfy a graduation requirement for med-
ical school in Mexico. 76 By signing this form he expressly renunciated
U.S. citizenship.77 The State Department processed this form and deter-
mined that Terrazas had committed an expatriating act and thus lost his
67. Id at 841.
68. Griffith, supra note 17, at 474.
69. IL
70. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
71. Griffith, supra note 17, at 474. See also Stephen M. Lopatkiewicz, Note, Citizenship -
Statutory Citizenship Subject to Congressional "Condition Subsequent" -Foreign-Born National
not Protected by Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship Clause, 13 HARV. INT. LJ. 151, 156
(1972).
72. Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1026.
73. Id
74. The following acts may result in expatriation: 1. Obtaining naturalization in a foreign
state upon one's own application; 2. Oath of Allegiance to a foreign state; 3. Entering the
armed forces of another state; 4. Accepting office with a foreign government; 5. Formal
renunciation of citizenship in the United States as prescribed and approved by the Attorney
General during war time; 6. Treason. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1988).
75. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1979).
76. Karen L. Yablonski-Toll, Comment, Vance v. Terrazas Expands the Erosion of the
Equal Rights of Dual Nationals, 9 DENVER J. OF INT'L LAW & POLIcY 265, 269-70 (1980).
77. Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 255.
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citizenship.73
Ostensibly this case involved two issues. First, whether in establish-
ing loss of citizenship the government had to prove that the citizen in-
tended to relinquish that citizenship, and second, whether this had to be
established by clear and convincing evidence.79 However, underlying
this case was also the question whether dual nationals commit expatriat-
ing acts by complying with the requirements of their other nationality.
In Terrazas, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals which
had held that "clear and convincing" evidence is required to establish
that someone intended to abandon U.S. citizenship. s° The Supreme
Court held that the government only had to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the individual intended to decline citizenship.8 The
preponderance standard was deemed adequate because expatriation pro-
ceedings are civil in nature and do not deprive one of his or her liberty.
8 2
However, voluntarily committing an expatriating act is insufficient to
prove this intent. 3
This is a somewhat ominous decision since denationalization virtu-
ally imposes exile on a citizen and strips a person of all his or her rights
and duties. Noteable also is the fact that the "preponderance" standard is
not consistent with the "clear, convincing and unequivocal" evidence
standard used to prove the fraudulent attainment of nationality in a de-
naturalization proceeding. 4
F. Present Legal Situation
The present legal situation is characterized by a more tolerant atti-
tude towards dual nationals. The five-year residency requirement of sec-
78. Id at 256.
79. Id at 255.
80. Id at 264.
81. Id at 270.
82. Id. at 266.
83. In 1990, the State Department publicized its new policy of presuming that U.S. citi-
zens who obtain naturalization in a foreign country intend to retain U.S. citizenship, The
United States will only revoke citizenship if individuals actually state that they desire to
renunciate their nationality by becoming nationals of another state. Thus, a person who is
naturalized in a foreign country, takes a routine oath of allegiance, or accepts non-policy level
employment with a foreign government does not have to submit a statement of intent to re-
main a U.S. citizenprior to committing the expatriating act of applying for another citizenship.
Once the consulate finds out about such an incident, the individual will have to assert in a
questionnaire that it was not his or her intention to relinquish citizenship. The consular officer
will then certify that this person has retained U.S. citizenship. CITIZENSHIP FAcT-SHEET FOR
AMERICANS OVERSEAS 5-6 (Association of Americans Resident Overseas & Association of
American Wives of Europeans eds., 1991).
84. Yablonski-Toll, supra note 76, at 269-70.
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tion 301(b) of the Immigration Act of 1952 was repealed in 1978.1"
Congress reasoned that the requirement discriminated against dual na-
tionals, and that the growing number of Americans born abroad needed
to be accommodated.
8 6
In 1986 a revised immigration and nationality act was passed."
The Act required parents to reside in the United States for five years
(instead of the ten years previously required), in order to pass on their
citizenship to their children."8 Furthermore, the Act struck out several
provisions of the expatriation statute.8 9
This residence requirement, although less harsh than the ten-year
requirement, still imposes undue hardship on the citizen. Most people do
not know of these requirements. Consequently, parents may suddenly
find that their children carry a different passport, or are even born state-
less. A foreign-born citizen who grew up abroad because his or her par-
ents were working for an American company overseas will not be able to
pass on U.S. citizenship to his or her children, even if this person at-
tended American schools and graduated from a U.S. college, unless the
residence requirement is fulfilled.
This situation has led to a number of odd results. In a few cases
mothers have chosen to have their child out of wedlock to take advantage
of the shorter residence requirement for mothers of illegitimate chil-
dren. 9° This choice is problematic; should such a mother marry later and
have more children, these children would not be born United States citi-
zens because the mother would not have fulfilled the requisite residence
requirement. It follows that these children would either be aliens or
stateless. While the first born would have no problems reentering the
United States, the younger siblings would have to undergo regular immi-
gration procedures for foreigners.
Another option would be to undertake the emotional and financial
ordeal of giving birth to the child on American soil in order for it to
become a Fourteenth Amendment citizen. However, most parents are
not aware of these citizenship problems until they try to register the new-
born at the consulate. At that point, the only option for them is to have
85. Act of Oct. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-432, 92 Stat. 1046.
86. Patricia McGarvey-Rosendahl, Comment, A New Approach to Dual Nationality, 8
Hous. J. oF INT'L L. 305, 319 n.146 (1986).
87. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, 100 Stat.
3655 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1988).
89. See supra note 74.
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1988).
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the child naturalized. This is a lengthy, bureaucratic process that may
even require the costly aid of an attorney.
In a future reform of the immigration and naturalization laws, Con-
gress should adopt a different attitude towards dual nationals and abolish
the residence requirement to pass on citizenship. This would prevent the
occurence of the odd situations described above. Instead, the United
States should follow the French example and welcome the skills and
wealth of experiences of citizens living abroad by allowing foreign-born
citizens to pass on their citizenship without restrictions.
IV. THE FRENCH EXAMPLE: CITIZENSHIP
ACQUIRED AT BIRTH
A. Development of the Law
Although not a common law country, France also based the confer-
ment of citizenship on jus soli. During the feudal period, allegiance to
the lord was created through birth on his land. After -the French Revolu-
tion the primary basis of gaining citizenship remainedjus soil. Addition-
ally, residence in France, ownership of property, or even mere
employment in France91 were sufficient to create citizenship.92
The Civil Code of 1804 first disrupted the tradition ofjus soli.93 Ar-
ticle 10 reserved the right of citizenship to the child born of a French
father, regardless of whether that child was born within the country or
abroad. The children born in France by a foreign parent could only re-
ceive citizenship by declaring, during the year following the age of major-
ity, their intention to remain permanent residents of France during the
year following majority.94
An explanation for this change towards jus sanguinis is that the
Civil Code of 1804 developed during a period of war when nationalistic
sentiments ran high. Furthermore, at that point in history, France was
one of the most populous countries of Western Europe, and therefore did
not need to raise population levels through an application ofjus soli.95
Since then, a struggle has developed to reintroduce the concept of
91. CHRISTIAN NGUYEN VAN YEN, DRorr DE L'IMMIGRATION 306 (1986),
92. Id
93. Jean-Michel Belorgey, Le Droit de la Nationalit6" Evolution Historique et Enjeux, in
QUESTIONS DE NATIONALITE - HISTOIRE ET ENJEUX D'UN CODE 58, 61-62 (Smain Laacher
ed., 1987).
94. Id. at 62-63.
95. GERARD-RENE DE GROOT, STAATSANGEH6RIGKEITSRECIIT IM WANDEL: EINE




jus soli into legislation. Most notable are the Act of the 7th of February
185196 and the Act of the 16th of July 1874.9" These Acts declared that
after two subsequent generations of a family were born in France a child
had to accept French citizenship.9 8 Thus, the child of a foreigner born in
France whose parent had also been born in France became automatically
a French citizen. This concept was known as double naissance. At the
same time it was made more difficult to repudiate French citizenship. To
this effect the Conseil d'Etat remarked in 1874 that it should not be pos-
sible for foreigners who had lived in France for two generations to evade
their civic duties by arguing that they were not French citizens, espe-
cially when they could not prove that they were still citizens of their
country of origin.99 France had a right to claim these defacto citizens as
genuine French subjects."m There were several reasons for this change in
attitude. The primary motivations were the decline of the birthrate and
an increase of foreigners residing in France.101 There was a strong con-
cern with the integration of foreigners into French society. Further, the
sentiment prevailed that after two generations of residence in France
these 'foreigners' had a duty of fulfilling their part in the national de-
fense. In addition, service in the military was considered an effective way
to promote assimilation.102 Thus, the development of French immigra-
tion laws was dominated by these very practical concerns.
B. Present Nationality Act' 03
The most recent nationality act of 1973 was the first in French his-
tory to be executed without the occurrence of any external threat to the
country."° At the time the movement to reform the Code de la Nation-
alit6 developed, the dominant sentiment was to allow French living
abroad to keep their nationality, or, where circumstances had forced
them to abandon it to allow them to recover citizenship.'05 In contrast,
the Code of 1945 required the loss of French citizenship upon acquiring
another, and only allowed, the reintegration of former nationals at the
96. Belorgey, supra note 93, at 63.
97. Id
98. Id
99. Id at 64.
100. Id
101. DE GROOT, supra note 95, at 79.
102. Belorgey, supra note 93, at 65.
103. Code de la Nationalit, Loin* 73-42 du 9 janv. 1973, J.O. 10 Janv. 467 (1), D.S.L 85-
91 (1973) [hereinafter Code].
104. Paul Lagarde, La Rdnovation du Code de la NationalitJ par Ia Loi du 9 Janyver 1973,
62 R.C.D.I.P. 431, 431-69 (1973).
105. Id
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discretion of the government."' The Code of 1945 was created when
foreign-French were regarded with suspicion grown out of the war.
10 7
This change in perception present in the 1973 act was based on the ra-
tionale that the presence of French citizens abroad had a positive effect
on France's image and influence there. "Les Frangais de l'6tranger"
were considered representatives of France's economic and cultural
concerns.' 
0 8
The present act preserves the doctrine ofjus sanguinis; the parent's
citizenship is passed to the child. Article 17 of the act states that a child
is French if he or she has at least one French parent. 109 It is irrelevant
whether the child was born legitimate or not.' 10 The rationale behind
this law is that a child raised by French parents will have grown up in an
environment that will provide for smooth integration into French soci-
ety. I This holds true even if the child is raised abroad by only one
French parent. In that case, however, the individual has a right to repu-
diate his or her citizenship." 2 This view differs significantly from the
American stance. The United States apparently considers the environ-
ment of the country in which a child is reared more influential than the
family.
Jus soli applies automatically at birth to: a) a child born in France
whose parentage is unknown; b) a child whose parents are stateless; and
c) a child whose parents cannot pass on their citizenship.113 This regula-
tion eliminates the problem of statelessness by birth, since a child that
cannot gain citizenship throughjus sanguinis will become a French citi-
zen through jus soli.
Individuals born in France of foreign parents have to live in France
for five years to become eligible for citizenship based on jus soli.
11 4
Thereafter, parents can make a declaration of nationality for the child
once he or she reaches the age of sixteen. 15 Alternatively, individuals
between the ages of sixteen and eighteen can declare their intention to
become French citizens provided they have the authorization of their
106. IL
107. Id at 447.
108. MARCEAU LONG, ETRE FRANgAIS AUJOURD'HuI ET DEMAIN: RAPPORT DV LA
COMMISSION DE LA NATIONALITt - TOME II, at 58 (1988).
109. Code supra note 103, art. 17.
110. Id.
111. LONG, supra note 108, at 114.
112. Id. at 115.
113. Code, supra note 103, art. 21.
114. Id. arts. 44, 52.
115. Id art. 54.
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parents.116 Citizenship based on birth in France can also be automati-
cally acquired by persons who had their permanent residence in France
during the five years preceding majority. 1" This automatic "naturaliza-
tion" can be estopped by expressly refusing citizenship during the year
preceding majority, 1 8 or when the government is opposed to conferring
citizenship.' 9 This is the case if the individual by that time has acquired
a criminal record or has failed to assimilate into French society. 2 ° As-
similation is generally shown by an adequate knowledge of the French
language.
12
The concept of consecutive birth in France, la double naissance,
first expressed in 1851,122 remains part of the present law."z However,
such a child can decline French citizenship during the six months prior
to attaining majority, provided that the parent has not become a natural-
ized citizen in the meantime. 124
More interesting are the regulations pertaining to foreign-born citi-
zens. While article 17 confers citizenship to anyone born to a French
parent, article 19 gives foreign-born French with one alien parent the
option to repudiate their citizenship during the six months preceding the
individual's eighteenth birthday. In this respect, the French situation
differs considerably from the United States. In contrast to the U.S. pol-
icy which makes the right to citizenship subject to certain conditions,
France's nationality law allows the individual to freely choose to accept
or decline French citizenship.
This illustrates the different philosophies of France and the United
States towards nationality. Within the French context citizenship is con-
sidered a duty, while Americans view it more as a privilege that has to be
earned. There is also a difference in the function of citizenship. In
116. Id. art. 52.
117. Id. art. 44.
118. Id. art. 45.
119. Id. art. 46.
120. Between 1973 and 1986 this provision was used only five times. LONG, supra note
108, at 132-33.
121. Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, L'Acquisition de la Nationalit Franaise une Condition
d'Integration?, in QUESTION DE NATIONALITE - HisToIRE Er ENjEUX DUN CODE, SUpra
note 93, at 94.
122. Belorgey, supra note 93, at 63.
123. Code, supra note 103, art. 23.
124. LONG, supra note 108, at 119. According to article 84 of the code, the minor child of a
naturalized adult will automatically acquire full French citizenship. The commission sug-
gested that this derivative citizenship should be restricted to minors who share the same per-
manent residence with their parents. Id at 143-44. All other minor children can become
French through a simplified naturalization procedure that does not require five years of resi-
dency. Id at 144-45.
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France, status and personal rights depend on nationality and not domi-
cile,125 whereas in the United States it is possible for a permanent resi-
dent to have the same personal rights, such as ownership rights, as a
citizen.
This is apparent in article 95. According to this article, French citi-
zenship can be passed on for 50 years after an individual's ancestor had a
permanent residence in France or its former colonies. Thus, a person
whose French grandparents lived in France and had their permanent res-
idence there 50 years ago will still be considered a French citizen
although this person has never set foot on French soil. Thereafter, loss of
citizenship may take place by judicial decision when the person, French
by origin or filiation: a) no longer has "possession d'tat;" b) never had
his or her habitual residence in France; and c) the ascendants of this
person had themselves not resided in France during the past 50 years or
did not use their French nationality.
12 6
Such a judicial decision is made by the "Tribunal de Grande In-
stance." '27 It is up to its discretion whether to declare a loss of citizen-
ship or not, even when none of the person's ascendants had resided in
France for over 50 years. 128 The concept of article 95 differs greatly from
the American Nationality Act which requires the parent to reside in the
country for five years before citizenship can be passed on.1
29
C. Current Developments
In 1987, a commission13 was organized to recommend a possible
reform of the Code de la Nationalit6. The commission commenced its
work at a time when France was experiencing considerable tension with
125. Lester B. Orfield, The Legal Effects of Dual Nationality, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427,
429 n.11 (1949). The French, German, and Italian Codes are based on the principle of
nationality.
126. Code, supra note 103, art. 95
127. MAURICE SHELDON AMOS ET. AL, AMOS AND WALTON'S INTRODUCTION TO
FRENCH LAW 7-8 (3d ed. 1967). France has 172 tribunaux de grande instance which serve as
courts of first instance with general jurisdiction over matters not e:pressly assigned to other
courts.
128. Code supra note 103, art. 95
Art. 95: La perte de la nationalit6 frangaise peut 8tre constat6e par jugement lorsque
l'int6ress6, frangais d'origine par filiation, n'en a point la possession d'etat ct n'a
jamais eu sa risidence habituelle en France, si les ascendants, dont il tenait ]a nation-
alit6 frangaise, n'ont eux-mames ni possession d'tat de Frangais ni r6sidencc en
France depuis un demi-si6cle.
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1988).
130. For a synopsis of the commission's findings see also John Guendelsbcrger, Reforming




regard to the ethnic composition of her population. The majority of for-
eigners living in France had traditionally been of European origin, with
Italians, Belgians, Portuguese and Spaniards prevailing. There was also
a sizeable number of Algerians due to France's colonial past. These
demographics changed during the 1980s. While in 1982, 80 percent of
the naturalized French were of European origin, 31 by 1986 this number
had dropped to 48.9 percent.1 32 Instead, 27 percent of the persons natu-
ralized, as compared to the 12.15 percent in 1982, were of African origin,
and 18.7 percent, as compared to 6.9 percent, were of Asian back-
ground. 13 3 This new situation sparked racial tension within France,
most notably evidenced in the rise of radical right wing leader Jean
Marie Le Pen. Le Pen successfully introduced a platform that advocated
"France First of All."'" According to his view, immigration presented
the primary cause of unemployment in France. 135 Additionally, he em-
phasized that "immigrants, essentially Arabs and Africans, (were]
equivalent to crime and disruption, and should be sent home."'136 After
the 1986 parliamentary elections, newly appointed Prime Minister Jac-
ques Chirac attempted to take a stricter stance on the immigration issue
in order to regain the support of the right wing constituency that had
sided with Le Pen. During his term, the Loi Pasqua, named after Inte-
rior Minister Charles Pasqua, passed. 137 It facilitated the expulsion of
foreigners by eliminating a right to appeal from a deportation order fash-
ioned after finding an individual a "threat to public order."' 38 Further, it
removed an immigrant's right to a resident permit should he or she have
served a prison term of more than six months.'
39
In addition, Chirac introduced a bill which would have restricted
the grant of citizenship to the children of foreigners born in France, un-
less they applied for French citizenship between the ages of 16 and 20,
131. MARCEAU LONG, ETRE FRANrAIs AujouRD'Hui E~r DE AiN: RAPPORT DE LA
COMMSSION DE LA NATIONALrrt - TOME I, at 47 (1988) [hereinafter ToME 1].
132. Id at 51.
133. Id
134. During the parliamentary elections on March 16, 1986, Le Pen's party, the National
Front, which had never been a member of the National Assembly before, won 33 seats. Rich-
ard Berstein, Rightist Parties appear to regain Power in France, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 17, 1986, at
Al; Stanley Meisler, In France an Echo of Prior Pain: Rightist Le Pen Recalls Sad Past, LA.
TImS, Apr. 7, 1985, § 4 (Opinion), at 2.
135. Id
136. John Vinocor, The Harsh Voice of the French Right, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1985, § 4
(Week in Review), at 2.
137. Loi n° 86-1025 du 9 septembre 1986, J.O. 12 Sept. 11035(1), D.S.L 474-76 (1986).
138. Id art. 7.
139. Id art. 2, q VI.
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and swore allegiance to France."4 With the approach of the 1988 elec-
tions Chirac withdrew the bill, but continued to pursue his goal of reform
of the nationality code. On June 22, 1987, he appointed a commission to
develop a reform of France's naturalization and immigration laws. 41
With the tension of this political situation as a backdrop, the com-
mission proposed changes to the present Code de ]a Nationalit6: a) to
promote the integration of individuals acquiring citizenship through jus
soli,142 and b) to give birthright citizens with minimal ties to France the
chance to repudiate their nationality.143 It was expected that this would
advance the integration of members of different ethnic groups into
French society, and assist the traditional institutions of integration, such
as the church, neighborhood, schools, and military, whose function in
the assimilation process had become inadequate. 14" The proposal em-
phasized the conscious choice of an individual to assume a French iden-
tity, instead of automatic conferment of citizenship throughjus soli.
The commission suggested to facilitating the repudiation of French
citizenship for those who had acquired it throughjus sanguinis from their
parents.145 Such a policy would limit the risks of forced dual nationality
by giving a person a chance to voluntarily accept or repudiate
citizenship.
Using the same rationale, the commision advocated extending the
time during which a French citizen born abroad could repudiate his or
her citizenship from six months before reaching majority 146 to one year
after reaching majority. 14 7
The commission's recommendations would primarily affect those
obtaining French citizenship through the doctrine of double naissance,
and those who were born in France with foreign parents who had lived in
the country for five years prior to attaining majority. 148 With regard to
individuals who might become French through double naissance, the
commision was particularly concerned with those people whose parents
were born in the old colonies. Birth in the territories of France over
which France had maintained control was equivalent to birth on French
140. Ian Davidson, Chirac Delays Bid to Tighten Nationality Law, FiN. TIMES, Sept. 11,
1987, § 1 (European News), at 2.
141. Id
142. See infra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
144. See LONG, supra note 108, at 44.
145. Id. at 114.
146. Code, supra note 103, art. 19.
147. LONG, supra note 108, at 115.
148. Code, supra note 103, arts. 44-46.
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soil. Should these children be born in France, they would acquire citi-
zenship through double naissance. This would have the somewhat ironic
effect that after gaining independence through, for instance, the Algerian
war, some people would still be subject to the duties of French citizen-
ship. To avoid such an imposition, the commission advocated the exten-
sion of the period during which repudiation of citizenship could occur
from the six months preceding majority to a year after attaining such.149
As a general principle though, the commission still supported the con-
cept of double naissance, since an extended residence that spanned more
than two generations appeared to express a desire on part of the 'alien'
family to establish permanent residency in Frane."s
The commission further voiced concerns with the subsequent impo-
sition of French citizenship on those individuals who were born in
France and automatically acquired it after fulfilling the residence re-
quirement.' It argued that these teenagers did not really have a chance
to make a positive choice to become citizens since their parents' personal
motivations could encourage them to make the decision for their child.
152
Until children reach the age of sixteen their parents can apply for citizen-
ship for them.153 One incentive for such an application would be the
resident permit, valid for 10 years, that the parents would receive as
guardians of a French citizen."' The child would thereby become com-
mitted to all the duties of a French citizen, including future military
service.
A similar scenario unfolds once the person reaches the age of six-
teen. The child must then apply for a 'carte de s6jour,' the equivalent of
a work and resident permit, or with their parents' permission, claim
French citizenship. 5 The commission objected on the same grounds as
above because the teenager would in reality make a choice whether or
not to decline citizenship. This would not constitute a positive decision
to accept French citizenship. Further, at age 18 the young adult would
automatically change his or her status from foreigner to citizen by virtue
of the law. 5 6 The person is practically seized by the law. 157 The legisla-
149. LONG, supra note 108, at 115-17.
150. Id. at 116.
151. Ia at 121.
152. .d
153. Code, supra note 103, art. 54.
154. In 1986, approximately 20% of the citizenship declarations under articles 52 or 54
were made for children under the age of five. LONG, supra note 108, at 121.
155. Code, supra note 103, arts. 52-53.
156. See id arts. 44-46, see also supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
157. LONG, supra note 108, at 122.
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ture's longstanding preoccupation with the drafting of the French-born
sons of foreign permanent French residents into the military accounts for
this sudden conferment of rights and duties."5 8
The commission saw in this automatic naturalization process the
danger that these children would become citizens by default and not by
choice.159 It feared that the assimilation process of the second generation
of immigrants would be impeded. In order to remedy this situation it
suggested facilitating the application process and educating these young
people of their right to repudiate or accept citizenship 60 For this pur-
pose information should be easily accessible at schools and government
agencies. Further, the time to make this choice should be extended until
the person was 21 years old.161 If the individual did not make an affirma-
tive committment to his or her citizenship at that point, the right to
claim it would be lost.
162
While forcing the individual to make an express committment to
French society, the commission also recommended a restraint on the
government in denying such people the right to citizenship. At present,
the government can deny a claim to citizenship if it decides that the ap-
plicant is not 'worthy,' or has not assimilated into French society.' 63 Al-
ternatively, the commission suggested that the government should adopt
a lenient standard where neither prior convictions, nor an arrest for ex-
pulsion purposes should be an obstacle to receiving citizenship when an
individual between the age of sixteen and eighteen decides to become a
citizen.164
The standard is somewhat stricter with regard to those who claim
their citizenship after the age of eighteen. In that case the government
should still have the power to refuse nationality if the individual a) has
been sentenced to imprisonment because of terrorist acts or other activi-
ties directed against the safety of the state; b) was sentenced to six
months of jail or more for drunk driving or procuring; or c) was arrested
to be deported as a threat to public order and the interest of the state.
165
At first glance the goals of the commission and the means with
which it attempts to achieve them appear laudable. However, forcing
young adults to make this public committment at a relatively young age
158. Id
159. Id. at 122-23.
160. Id.
161. Id at 125.
162. Id. at 123-30.
163. Code, supra note 103, art. 46.
164. LONG, supra note 108, at 131.
165. Id. at 132-33.
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may impede the assimilation process rather than improve it. Instead of
becoming citizens by default, they remain foreigners by default, a group
separate from the rest of society that may be more difficult to assimilate.
Since renewal of the carte de sejour is not necessarily automatic, the
threat of future deportation exists. As a result, it is impossible to plan a
life that relies on assimilation into French society. Should one of these
foreign-born teenagers decide not to choose French citizenship before his
or her deadline, due to family pressure or the convenience of not having
to serve the mandatory twelve month military service, the person would
effectively be locked out of the society in which he or she grew up, and
could only rejoin it through a lengthy naturalization process. It appears
therefore that the present regulation better serves the assimilation pro-
cess than the one suggested by the commission, since it automatically
confers citizenship and allows a person to renunciate it later.
The proposals of the commission have not been translated into a
reform of the Code de la Nationalit6. After Chirac lost the presidential
elections to socialist President Mitterand in 1988, the debate over a more
restrictive concept of jus soli lost its momentum. Le Pen's outspoken
racism had initiated a counter-movement that advocated integration and
peaceful coexistence of French and immigrants. This movement, known
as 'S.O.S. Racism' (with the slogan 'Don't touch my Buddy'") made it
obvious that Le Pen had not gained the support of the French population
as a whole.
In the summer of 1989, a bill passed in the legislature that virtually
overturned the restrictions imposed on foreigners by the Loi Pasqua.'16
For the near future, this will most likely remain the last measure facilitat-
ing the immigration process for foreigners, particularly non-Europeans.
In response to popular resistance Prime Minister Michel Rocard aban-
doned a bill that would have given resident non-citizens the right to vote
in municipal elections.' 68 Moreover, the recent desecrations of graves in
the Jewish cemetery in Carpentras as well as the "headscarf conflict,"16 9
are indications that the French public is not quite ready to accept a more
radical reform of the Code de la Nationalit6 Frangaise.
166. Flora Lewis, Words of God and Evil, N.Y.TIM s, June 17, 1985, § A, at 19.
167. Loi N' 89-548 du 2 aofit 1989, J.0. aofit 9952(1), D.S.L 272-74 (1989).
168. Sarah Lambert, Jewish Graves Attack Leads to Spate of Soul Searching, IND., May 19,
1990, Foreign News Page, at 10.
169. The headmaster of a secondary school in France suspended three Moslem girls for
wearing headscarves in class. George Graham, Islam Rekindles War of Church and State.
FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1989, § 1 (European News), at 3.
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V. COMPARISON
In comparing France with the United States, it appears that the two
countries' policies result in exactly opposite problems. While France has
never been a pure immigration country, it has been very generous to its
own citizens who chose to live abroad. However, France has little expe-
rience in dealing with a multi-ethnic society. This becomes evident in the
emphasis the commissions' report puts on the integration of foreigners
into French society rather than promoting a multi-cultural society.
17 0
On the other hand, the United States, as an innigration country,
embraces the diversity of its population, but makes little attempt to es-
tablish any ties with its citizens living abroad. This becomes obvious in
the restrictive position the U.S. takes towards situations in which dual
nationality may arise, although admittedly a number of regulations have
been eased over the past forty years.
France does not perceive citizens who may also owe allegiance to
another country as threats, and respects their choice to live abroad.
There is no parade of horrors as cited in U.S. opinions describing the fair
weather citizen. The U.S. ought to carefully study France's experience
with dual nationals and accept the benefits that could be gained from
those citizens.
VI. THE FAIR WEATHER CITIZEN
The greatest fear of the United States with regard to dual nationals
appears to be the embarrassment caused by citizens who become em-
broiled in international conflicts.17 1 This fear is completely unfounded,
considering the ample experience the International Court of Justice has
had employing the concept of "effective nationality" in cases where dual
nationals were involved.
Most recently this concept was used to adjudicate the claims of dual
nationals in front of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.172 In deter-
mining whether a dual national had standing in front of the Tribunal
73
the Chamber looked to the Hague Convention On Certain Questions Re-
lating To The Conflict of Nationality Law of 1930.174 The Convention
170. See LONG, supra note 108, at 82-106.
171. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 60-62 (1958).
172. Peter E. Mahoney, Note, The Standing of Dual Nationals Before the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, 24 VA. J. OF INT'L. L. 695 (1984).
173. Id at 695 n.4 (quoting Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, Award No. 31-157-2 (Mar. 29,
1983)).
174. Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, opened
for signature, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter The Hague Convention].
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combined two approaches to resolving such a conflict of nationality laws.
In article 4 the Convention adopted the doctrine of "non-responsibility"
as follows: "[a] State may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its
nationals against a State whose nationality such person also possesses."
Additionally, in article 5 the Convention endorsed the doctrine of effec-
tive nationality with regard to third countries. According to this doc-
trine a third state shall treat a dual national as if he or she had only one
nationality recognizing "the nationality of the country in which he [or
she] is habitually and principally resident, or the nationality of the coun-
try with which in the circumstances he [or she] appears to be in fact most
closely connected."' 75 Thus a third state would only recognize an indi-
vidual's "effective nationality," the citizenship of the country to which
the person has the closest ties.
Noting that the Convention was over 50 years old, and that since
the time of its adoption the scope of diplomatic protection had greatly
expanded, the Chamber concluded that in a case where an individual
brought a claim before an international tribunal, as opposed to a state on
behalf of an individual, article 4 of the Hague Convention did not ap-
ply.'7 6 The Chamber pointed in particular to the Nottebohm t" and
Merge7 cases which approved of the use of the doctrine of effective na-
tionality to determine whether an individual has standing. 17 9
Should a dual national become involved in an international legal
conflict, the United States can apply the doctrine of effective nationality,
as stated in article 5 of the Hague Convention, to determine whether or
not it is appropriate to extend the protection it owes to a citizen. Thus,
in a conflict between France and the United States involving a dual na-
175. Id art. 5.
176. Mahoney, supra note 172, at 713.
177. The Court held:
International arbitrators have decided in the same way numerous cases of dual na-
tionality, where the question arose with regard to the exercise of protection. They
have given their preference to the real and effective nationality, that which accorded
with the facts, that based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned and
one of the States whose nationality is involved.
Ia at 709-10 n.74 (citing Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.) 1955 LCJ. 4, 22 (Apr. 6)).
178. The Court held:
The principle [of non-responsibility], based on the sovereign equality of States, which
excludes diplomatic protection in the case of dual nationality, must yield before the
principle of effective nationality, whenever such nationality is that of the claiming
State. But it must not yield when such predominance is not proved because the first
of these two principles is generally recognised and may constitute a criterion of prac-
tical application of the elimination of any possible uncertainty.
Ia at 710 n.80 (citing Mergd, 14 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 236, 247 (1955)).
179. Id at 713.
19921
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
tional of both countries who has obviously stronger ties to France, the
United States may not be as justified to extend protection as in a claim
involving a dual national with stronger ties to the United States."' 0 Con-
sidering the precedent, the concept of effective nationality has proven to
be a fair and efficient method to resolve situations where conflicts of law
arise.
VII. CONCLUSION
In view of the international interdependency of the United States
with the rest of the world, it is imperative for the United States to de-
velop a more liberal attitude towards dual nationality. The argument
that a dual national could easily become a liability and embarrassment to
the state is unconvincing, especially considering that there are effective
methods to resolve these situations.
There is also an economic aspect to this problem. In order for the
United States to remain competitive globally, it has to support the idea of
dual nationality. Non-nationals are often denied the right to work or
reside in a country longer than a certain period of time although their
family and children are nationals. As a non-national it is particularly
difficult to get a work permit. Further, unlike the U.S., a number of
countries do not confer a permanent resident alien status to non-nation-
als which would allow them to function within the country without hav-
ing to accept citizenship. Thus, these Americans living abroad are in a
permanent state of insecurity."' 1 Allowing citizenship to be passed on to
the second generation will make it easier for Americans to accept posi-
tions abroad, build up businesses abroad, and promote the U.S. economy
abroad.
By acknowledging its citizens overseas, the U.S. can draw from an
expertise that is becoming vital. These Americans have an intimate
knowledge of another culture and language which is extremely valuable
for a better understanding among nations. In order not to deprive itself
of these nationals and in the interest of family unity, the United States
should follow the French model and abolish the residence requirement
for citizens to pass on their U.S. citizenship. 18 2 As far as any fears of an
180. When analyzing Esphahanian's ties to the U.S. the Chamber specifically looked at
residence, military service, marriage investment and civic activities as important factors. Id. at
715.
181. Comment, supra note 7, at 301 n.62.
182. A similar proposal was made in article 4 of the Draft Convention on Nationality by
the Harvard Research in International Law Project: "A state may not confer its nationality at
birth (jure sanguinis) upon a person born in the territory of another state beyond the second
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attenuated citizenship are concerned, article 95 of the French Code Civil
appears to have found an adequate solution by compelling the ancestors
of a person claiming citizenship to have resided in France at least 50
years prior to the claim. With such an amendment the U.S. could no
more be accused of having created second-class citizens.
generation of persons born and continuously maintaining an habitual residence therein, if such
person has the nationality of such other state." Orfield, supra note 125, at 433 (citing Research
in International Law, Harvard Law School, Draft Convention on Nationality, art. IV., 23.
AM. J. INT. L. SPEc. Supp. H, 30-32 (1929) (emphasis added).

